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Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence
from Agricultural Policies
Alessandro Olper and Johan Swinnen
Mass media play a crucial role in information distribution and in the political market
and public policy making. Theory predicts that information provided by the mass
media reflects the media’s incentives to provide news to different groups in society and
affects these groups’ influence in policy making. We use data on agricultural policy
from 69 countries spanning a wide range of development stages and media markets to
test these predictions. Our empirical results are consistent with theoretical hypotheses
that public support for agriculture is affected by the mass media. In particular, an in-
crease in media (television) diffusion is associated with policies that benefit the majori-
ty to a greater extent and is correlated with a reduction in agriculture taxation in poor
countries and a reduction in the subsidization of agriculture in rich countries, ceteris
paribus. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that increased compe-
tition in commercial media reduces transfers to special interest groups and contributes
to more efficient public policies. JEL Codes: D72, D83, Q18
There is a rapidly growing body of literature on the economics of the mass
media. This literature has led to a series of important new hypotheses and in-
sights in an area that has been long neglected by economists.1 An important
strand of this literature concerns the role of mass media in political markets
and its effect on public policy making. Most of this literature on the relation-
ship between the mass media and public policy is theoretical. A few empirical
studies have attempted to assess the effect of media on policy outcomes. Some
key findings from this literature suggest that access to mass media empowers
people politically and, as such, increases the benefits they receive from
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government programs (Stro¨mberg and Snyder 2008). This influence has been
found for different types of government programs and different countries, such
as unemployment relief in the United States (Stro¨mberg 2004b), public food
provision and disaster relief in India (Besley and Burgess 2001, 2002), and edu-
cational spending in Uganda and Madagascar (Reinikka and Svensson 2005;
Francken et al. 2009). All of these studies measure the effect within a single
country, which has the benefit of holding many other factors fixed but has the
potential disadvantage of limited variation in policy and media.
Our paper seeks to contribute to this empirical literature by analyzing the
impact of mass media on policy making for a specific type of policy across a
wide variety of countries and years. We use a new dataset from the World
Bank that includes measures of agricultural subsidization and taxation for a
much wider set of countries and a longer period of time than has been previ-
ously available (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). We use these data as the de-
pendent variable.
Agricultural policy (subsidization or taxation) is an excellent policy instru-
ment to study the impact of media on policy choice across a wide variation of
countries for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, agricultural
policy is an important policy for governments in both rich and poor countries.
In poor countries where agriculture is a very important share of the economy
and food is a major consumption item, the importance of agriculture as a
public policy issue is obvious. However, in rich countries, agricultural policy
remains disproportionately important compared to the relatively small share of
agriculture in terms of economic output. For example in the European Union,
the Common Agricultural Policy continues to absorb 40 percent of the entire
European Union budget. Another symptom of the continued importance of ag-
ricultural policy for rich countries is the impasse in the current WTO negotia-
tions, where disagreements over agricultural policies threaten to undermine the
entire WTO agreement.
Another empirical factor is the substantial ad hoc and case study evidence
that mass media can play an important role in influencing agricultural policy.
Several studies have highlighted the important role of mass media in influenc-
ing voters and government policy on key recent agricultural and food policies,
such as the use of genetically modified organisms (Curtiss et al. 2006; Marks,
et al. 2003; Vigani and Olper 2012), policy reactions to food safety crises
(Swinnen et al. 2005; Verbeke et al. 2000), and trade disputes (Kuzyk and
McCluskey 2006; Swinnen and Francken 2006).
Agricultural policy is also an interesting case from a theoretical perspective.
The literature on the political economy of agricultural policy identifies group
size (the number of farmers versus the number of food consumers in the
economy) as an important causal factor. Group size is argued to play an im-
portant role because it affects collective action costs (based on Olson 1965)
and affects the per capita costs and benefits of agricultural policy, which, in
turn, affects political outcomes in the presence of voter information costs
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(based on Downs 1957) or when political activities are proportional to the size
of potential policy costs and benefits (Swinnen 1994). Recent papers in the
media economics literature claim that the mass media can play an important
role in public policy by altering these political economy mechanisms
(Stromberg 2001, 2004a; Kuzyk and McCluskey, 2006). Oberholzer-Gee and
Waldfogel (2005) argue that the link between group size and political mobili-
zation depends on the structure of media markets. In a series of influential
papers, Stro¨mberg (2001, 2004a) has shown that competition among mass
media outlets leads to the provision of more news/information to large groups
such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, altering the trade-off in po-
litical competition and thus influencing public policy. He refers to this outcome
as “mass media-competition-induced political bias.”
The purpose of our paper is to evaluate whether the mass media have an
impact on the political economy of agricultural policies by exploiting taxation
and subsidization data from 69 countries that were observed from 1960 to
2004. The paper also contributes to an emerging body of literature analyzing
whether the diffusion of free and independent media are key ingredients in
more efficient public policies. Besley and Burgess (2001, 2002) use a political
agency model to demonstrate that a more informed and politically active elec-
torate increases the incentives for a government to be responsive. Prat and
Stro¨mberg (2005) find for Sweden that people who begin watching commercial
television (TV) news programs increase their political knowledge and participa-
tion. Overall, this and other evidence (such as Besley and Burgess 2001, 2002;
Francken et al. 2009, 2012; Reinikka and Svensson 2005; Stro¨mberg and
Snyder 2008) support the notion that the mass media reduce the power of
special interest lobbies relative to unorganized interests.
The paper also contributes to the literature on the political economy of agri-
cultural policies. There is extensive literature, both theoretical and empirical, on
the determinants of agricultural policy making (see de Gorter and Swinnen 2002;
Swinnen 2010; Anderson et al. 2013 for surveys), but no previous study has ex-
amined the role of the media in this process. Our paper is the first to do so.
Our analysis, which exploits both cross-country and time-series variation in
the data, indicates that the mass media may have a substantive impact on
public agricultural policy. In the developing world, agricultural taxation is
reduced by the presence of mass media outlets, whereas agricultural support is
reduced in developed countries. Our results thus suggest that competition in
the media market is associated with a reduction of policy distortions in agricul-
tural markets.
I . CONC E P T U A L FR AM EWORK
In this section, we first present a conceptual framework based on Stro¨mberg’s
(2004a) theory of mass media and political competition. Then, we discuss the
main implications of the model in light of the worldwide characteristics and
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regularities of agricultural policies, and we identify testable hypotheses regard-
ing the effect of mass media competition on agricultural policy outcomes.
The Basic Theory
In Stro¨mberg’s (2004a) model, mass media outlets affect public policy because
they provide the channel through which politicians convey campaign promises
to the electorate. Political parties make binding announcements regarding the
amount of public money they plan to spend on various government programs.
The two parties propose public spending with the objective of maximizing
their vote shares within a given budget constraint.
Commercial media2 are the only channel through which the parties’ plat-
forms are announced to the voters. Media firms allocate a certain quantity of
information on political platforms and proposed spending levels with the ob-
jective of maximizing their audiences (number of readers/viewers), all of which
are voters. Voters purchase media products (e.g., newspapers) and adjust their
expectations of how much the parties will spend on the basis of information
provided by the media. They then vote for one of the parties. The party that
wins the election implements the promised spending plan.
Voters value news related to political platforms in the media because it
allows them to maximize the benefits they receive from government programs.
It is assumed that readers (voters) use the news they receive from the media to
decide on private action, which affects the value they realize from a govern-
ment program. More precise news about future policies makes it more likely
that readers will take the correct private actions. For example, early news
about changes in agricultural subsidies help farmers to produce the correct
crops to realize the full value of these subsidies.
Voters purchase the media product that provides them with the most infor-
mation on the government programs they value, conditional on other (exoge-
nous) characteristics, such as ideological preferences.
The media maximize expected profits. They have two types of costs: “first
copy costs,” or the cost of producing one unit of news space, and “reproduc-
tion and distribution costs,” or the average cost of reproducing and delivering
the media product to a certain audience. This cost function is consistent with
the notion that there are roughly constant long-run marginal costs in distribut-
ing TV and radio news (or in printing and delivering newspapers). The revenue
of the media includes the price they can charge for their product plus the price
per reader/viewer paid by advertisers. This structure of the media industry
implies that different groups receive different media coverage. News items of
interest to small groups and groups with limited attractiveness for advertisers
receive less coverage.
2. In his theoretical derivations, Stromberg (2004a) refers to the media as “newspapers” but
explains that for the purposes of the main points of his analysis, the cost and revenue structures of TV
and radio are similar in the relevant aspects.
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This bias in the mass media’s news coverage translates into policy bias. As
media coverage of different issues changes, the efficiency with which politicians
can reach different groups with campaign promises also changes. If a party
promises a group that receives very little news coverage that it will raise spend-
ing, only a small fraction of the voters who would benefit become aware of the
promise. Therefore, a spending promise to this group will not win many votes
for the party. Consequently, this group of voters will not attract many favor-
able policies. Instead, promising to raise spending for groups that attract sub-
stantial media coverage (for example, because they are large groups or because
the groups are more valuable to advertisers) will lead to a stronger voter re-
sponse and thus to policies that are more favorable to these groups.
Implications for Agricultural Policy
What does this theory imply for the impact of mass media on agricultural
policy?3 The most important stylized fact about agricultural policy is the
so-called development paradox, the policy switch from the taxation to the sub-
sidization of agriculture associated with economic development (Anderson and
Hayami, 1986; Anderson, 2009). The classic interpretation of this pattern is
that when a country becomes richer, farm groups, compared to consumer and
taxpayer groups, become more effective in collective action situations as the
number of farmers declines and development reduces communication and
transportation costs. Both factors reduce organizational costs and free rider
problems in collective action situations (Olson, 1965). Moreover, because the
per capita cost experienced by the rest of society falls with fewer farmers, the
opposition of taxpayers and consumers to (agricultural) subsidies decreases as
the number of farmers decreases as a result of economic development (Becker
1983; Swinnen 1994; Anderson 1995).
The model developed here suggests that the relationship between agricultural
policy and economic development will be affected by the introduction of media
competition in the political market. Voter preferences and government policies
will be affected by how the media industry provides information to citizens.
One key prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, government trans-
fers such as agricultural protection should be biased toward large groups as an
effect of media competition. Because the agricultural group (the number of
farmers) is relatively large in poor countries and relatively small in richer ones,
an important implication of the model is that, ceteris paribus, the effect of
media competition on agricultural policy should differ in poor versus rich
countries. More specifically, we expect that the impact on agricultural protec-
tion induced by mass media competition should be positive in poor countries
3. Stromberg’s (2004a) basic model has a fixed budget constraint. This assumption is later relaxed
(see section 3.2 and footnote 16 of his paper) to allow for government programs, such as taxes and
subsidies, which influence the budget itself. Endogenizing the government budget in this extended
model does not affect the main results (or our hypotheses).
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and negative in rich countries. Thus, we can formulate the following empirical
prediction.
Hypothesis 1 (Group size effect): Mass media competition-induced political
bias will reduce agricultural protection in rich (developed) countries but will
increase agricultural protection in poor (developing) countries, ceteris paribus.
Another prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, government trans-
fers will be biased toward groups that are more attractive to advertisers.
Stromberg (2004a) refers to the case of the show Gunsmoke, which was can-
celled despite its high ratings because its audience was perceived as “too old
and too rural” to be of much interest to advertisers.
The implication for agricultural protection is not obvious because “being at-
tractive to advertisers” may apply to many things, including age (young people
are more easily influenced by advertisements than older people), income (richer
people have more money to spend), and so forth. The latter argument would
imply that mass media competition would induce government transfers to be
biased toward relatively richer groups who have more income to spend and are
therefore more attractive to advertisers.
Nevertheless, the implication for agricultural protection is not trivial. The
relationship between economic development and the rural-urban income gap is
the subject of some debate. Recent papers have argued that this relationship is
nonlinear, with a relatively small gap in very poor countries (as incomes in
both urban and rural areas are very low), urban incomes rising relative to rural
incomes when countries grow, and the income gap narrowing again at high
income levels (see Hayami 2007; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). This nonlinear
relationship would also follow if the spread of TV were uneven between urban
and rural areas, reflecting the differences in income (demand for TVs). There
would be a relatively small gap in very poor countries (as TV distribution in
both urban and rural areas is very low) and a rise in urban TV distribution rela-
tive to rural TV distribution when countries grow, with the gap in TV distribu-
tion narrowing again at high income levels. In either case, this channel would
add a nonlinear relationship between average incomes and media effects, with a
prourban media bias effect that would be strongest at medium income levels.
However, a problem with using observed (sectoral) income to document this
nonlinear relationship between the rural-urban income gap and overall income
is that the observed sectoral income levels are obviously affected by the policies
themselves. With occasionally very large subsidies or taxes, these policy trans-
fers clearly affect the relative income measures. With transfers going from rural
to urban areas in poor countries (and vice versa in rich countries), we would
expect the pretransfer rural-urban income ratio to be higher (lower) than that
observed in poor (rich) countries. In medium income countries, the transfers
are relatively lower; thus, the observed income ratio is closer to the pretransfer
ratio.
This situation would imply that the expected “advertiser-value effect” of
media competition on agricultural protection should be as follows: small in
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(very) poor countries, because pretransfer rural and urban incomes are similar,
and low and negative in rich and emerging countries, where pretransfer urban
incomes are much higher than rural incomes. Thus, we can formulate the fol-
lowing empirical prediction (conditional on an observed nonlinear relationship
between the rural-urban income ratio and economic development).
Hypothesis 2 (Advertiser value effect): Mass media competition-induced po-
litical bias will reduce agricultural protection in rich (developed) and emerging
countries and will have little effect in poor (developing) countries, ceteris
paribus.
In combination, these two effects imply that the total media effect will in-
crease agricultural protection (or reduce agricultural taxation) in poor coun-
tries owing to the group size effect, reduce agricultural protection in emerging
countries owing to the advertiser value effect, and more strongly reduce agri-
cultural protection in rich countries owing to the reinforcement of group size
and advertiser value effects.
The next sections present the data and empirical strategy used to test the
hypotheses.
I I . DATA AND EMP I R I C A L S P E C I F I CAT I ON
We test our predictions on annual observations from a sample of approximate-
ly 70 developing and developed countries from all continents. Overall, we
employ a panel of more than 2,000 observations, but the panel structure is un-
balanced. Specifically, for a few developed countries, the starting year is ap-
proximately 1960; for the majority of the sample, the starting year is
approximately 1970; and for transition countries, it is approximately 1992.
The last year of observations is 2004. Table S.1 (in the supplemental appendix,
available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/) reports the full list of countries
with data and the 1970 and 2002 values of key policy and media variables.
Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables are measures of agricultural protection. As an indica-
tor of agricultural taxation and subsidization, we use the relative rate of assis-
tance (RRA) to agriculture, taken from the Agricultural Distortions Database
from the World Bank (see Anderson and Valenzuela 2008 for details). The
RRA index is calculated as the ratio between the agricultural and nonagricul-
tural nominal rates of assistance:
RRA ¼ 1þNRAag
 
= 1þNRAnonag
  1 
where NRAag is the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture and NRAnonag is
the nominal assistance to nonagricultural sectors. The NRAag measures total
transfers to agriculture as a percentage of the undistorted unit value. It is
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positive when agriculture is subsidized, negative when it is taxed, and zero
when net transfers are zero. The NRAag at the agricultural level is obtained as
the weighted average of assistance at the product level using the undistorted
value of production as a weight. It includes a wide range of policies, such as
the assistance provided by all tariff and nontariff trade measures applied to ag-
ricultural products and any domestic price-distorting measures. In addition, the
price equivalent of any direct interventions on inputs is included.
One advantage of using RRA (instead of NRA) as the dependent variable is
that, especially in developing countries, an important indirect source of agricul-
tural taxation is trade protection for the manufacturing sector as a component
of import-substitution policies. Thus, RRA is a more useful indicator in an in-
ternational comparison of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an
anti- or proagricultural bias. However, as a robustness check and to assess
whether changes in agricultural policy or industrial protection are important el-
ements in the media-protection relationship, we ran a series of additional re-
gressions using the NRA as the dependent variable.
Mass Media Variables
To test our hypotheses, we use the penetration of TV sets as an indicator.
More specifically, our variable is the natural logarithm of TV sets per 100 in-
habitants, based on data from the Arthur S. Banks Cross National Time-Series
Data Archive, supplemented by UNESCO Statistics on TV and data from the
International Telecommunication Union (2010).4
The rationale for using this proxy is that, although the share of informed
voters is not observed, we can observe the share of media users. Because both
move together, it is sufficient to examine the levels and changes in the share of
media users to test the effect of media bias (see Stro¨mberg 2004b). Moreover,
in our specific context, another justification for the use of these indicators is
derived from Stro¨mberg’s (2004a, p. 266) argument that “the emergence of
broadcast media increased the proportion of rural and low-education media
consumers as it became less expensive to distribute radio waves than newspa-
pers to remote areas, and as these groups preferred audible and visual enter-
tainment to reading. As politicians could reach rural and low-education voters
more efficiently, the model predicts an expansion in programs that benefits
these voters.”
4. Both the Arthur Banks and the International Telecommunication Union data are based on data
originally collected by UNESCO. These data are collected annually from 1970 onward. From 1960 to
1970, the data were collected every five years. Thus, for that period, we only use data for 1960, 1965,
and 1970 without any interpolation. A potential limitation of these data lies in the fact that some
countries have a licensing scheme whereby TV sets (or radios) must be registered. Because households
may have more than one TV receiver or may not register, the number of licensed receivers may
understate the true number of TVs and radios. Our identification strategy exploits the within-country
variation in the data (see section 5). As long as the number of licenses and of TVs/radios display similar
growth paths, this limitation of the data should not pose a major problem.
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Income and Group Size Variables
The hypotheses advanced in section II imply that the relationship between the
media variable and RRA (NRA) is conditional on the level of development
(income), partially due to group size effects. As an indicator of development
(income), we use real per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (gdppc)
taken from the Penn World Tables.5 The most direct indicator of (relative)
group size is the share of agricultural employment, emps, based on FAO data.
However, as is well known, both are strongly correlated because the agricultur-
al employment share decreases with economic development. Therefore, gdppc
is itself an indicator of relative group size.
In our basic specifications, we use gdppc as the primary indicator for the
conditional effect of media on agricultural protection because the employment
share data are of poor quality, which precludes a consistent comparison across
countries and over time, especially for developing countries (see Timmer and
de Vries 2007 for a discussion). One reason for the poor quality is the differ-
ences in national definitions of “agricultural labor.” Another reason is that the
yearly “observations” in the FAO labor statistics are linear interpolations
between census data collected once every decade. We understand that there are
also problems with the measurement of gdppc because national accounts data
are noisy over short time horizons (see Deaton 2005), but we believe the data
problems are less important for gdppc than for emps. However, we perform a
series of robustness checks using emps as indicator.
Both variables (the level of development and employment share) are also in-
cluded as control variables because both have been identified as major determi-
nants of agricultural protection outside the media effect.
Other Control Variables
In addition to the variables discussed above, in the empirical specifications, we
include controls that are likely to affect the level of agricultural protection, as
suggested by previous studies. Standard control variables in studies on the po-
litical economy of agricultural policies are indicators of comparative advan-
tage, trade status, terms of trade effects, and political institutions (see Olper
2007; Swinnen 2010; Olper and Raimondi 2012). To control for comparative
advantage, we include agricultural land per capita, landpc, and the agricultural
export share, exps, measured as net exports over production. These two vari-
ables are based on data from FAO and the World Bank’s Agricultural
Distortions Database. Because of the possibility that governments set agricul-
tural protection to exploit terms of trade effects, we also control for country
size using the log of population, logpop. We proxy for political institutions by
5. Specifically, we use the variable rgdpch from the Penn World Tables, version 6.3.
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adding the Polity2 index of democracy taken from the Polity IV database
(Marshall and Jaeggers 2007).6
In addition to these standard control variables, we use a series of covariates
to check the robustness of our findings (Olper et al. 2013). They include two
different indicators of (aggregated) openness: the ratio of trade to GDP from
the Penn World Tables and the Sachs-Warner index of openness as defined by
Wacziarg and Welch (2008).7 We use government consumption to GDP from
the Penn World Tables as a proxy for government size. Finally, because eco-
nomic crises may trigger policy reforms, we add two lags of a crisis variable
measured with a dummy equal to one for every year that the real GDP per
capita growth rate is negative (zero otherwise). Table 1 presents summary sta-
tistics for the variables described above.
I I I . D E S C R I P T I V E S TAT I S T I C S AND ANA LY S I S
Figures 1 and 2 present trends in the agricultural policy indicators (RRA and
NRA) and the media variable (number of TVs per 100 inhabitants) for the
period from 1970 to 2004 for selected countries. Table S.1 in the online appen-
dix presents the figures for 1970 and 2002 for all countries in the dataset. The
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Std.
Dev. Min. Max. Obs. Countries
RRA 12.71 64.63 294.62 404.87 2,020 69
NRA 20.11 67.19 293.11 432.72 2,231 69
Log TVs ( 100 inhabitants) 1.89 2.10 26.91 4.60 2,231 69
GDP per capita (in purchasing power
parity)
9,808 10,313 259 45,947 2,231 69
Agricultural employment share 0.38 0.29 0.01 0.92 2,231 69
Land per capita 1.72 3.97 0.04 41.51 2,231 69
Net export share 0.01 0.36 21.73 1.28 2,087 69
Log population 9.97 1.29 7.21 14.07 2,231 69
Democracy index (Polity2) 3.26 7.13 29.00 10.00 2,231 69
Government consumption 17.13 9.18 1.38 85.37 2,230 69
Trade to GDP ratio 51.66 31.17 5.00 622.63 2,224 69
Sach-Warner trade policy index 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 2,178 69
Economic crisis 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 2,231 69
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
6. The Polity2 index assigns a value ranging from 210 (autocracy) to þ10 (democracy) to each
country and year, with higher values associated with stronger democracies.
7. Wacziarg and Welch (2008) updated the Sachs and Warner index and exploited its time
dimension. The index is equal to one when a country is considered open and zero otherwise. Thus, it
captures reforms in the overall trade policy.
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figures reveal that there is substantive variation in all indicators both over time
and between countries.
Figure 1 illustrates the stylized fact that RRA and NRA are higher in rich
countries (Canada and Germany) than in poor countries (India and Kenya).
FIGURE 1. Indicators of Agricultural Policies (RRA, NRA) in Selected
Countries (1970–2004)
Note: Three-year moving averages of both RRA and NRA.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Agridistortions databases (World Bank).
FIGURE 2. Indicators of Mass Media: TVs per 100 Inhabitants in Selected
Countries (1970–2004)
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
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Support for farmers was particularly high in Germany, with an RRA between
50 percent and 100 percent for much of the period. The level of taxation faced
by farmers was particularly severe in India before 1980, with RRA figures of
approximately 50 percent. Figure 1 also shows that the variation in NRA and
RRA between countries has declined over time, with agricultural taxation de-
clining (RRA increasing) in poor countries and agricultural subsidies for agri-
culture falling (RRA decreasing) in rich countries. On average, the RRA for
the full sample increased from approximately 0 percent in the 1970s to approx-
imately 20 percent in the 1980s, subsequently declining to approximately
10 percent in 2000 (the NRA values differ, but the patterns are similar).
Figure 2 illustrates the differences in TV penetration across countries and
over time. The number of TVs increased everywhere over time, but, not sur-
prisingly, the numbers are much higher in rich countries than in poor ones.
The number of TVs increased from approximately 35 per 100 inhabitants in
1970 to approximately 60 in Germany and 75 in Canada by 2000. In the poor
countries, the number of TVs was nearly zero until the mid-1980s. It remains
very low in Kenya. The increase is somewhat more rapid in India, reaching ap-
proximately 10 per 100 inhabitants in 2000.
A comparison of figures 1 and 2 suggests a different relationship between ag-
ricultural policies and the spread of mass media in rich and poor countries: for
poor countries (such as Kenya), the RRA increased over the 1970–2004
period, and mass media also grew. In contrast, for rich countries (such as
Germany), the RRA declined, whereas mass media continued to grow.
To further analyze this relationship between mass media and agricultural
policies, table 2 reports simple pair-wise correlations between the media vari-
able and the agricultural protection indicators for different levels of develop-
ment (organized as percentiles of per capita GDP). The pair-wise correlations
TABLE 2. Correlation Coefficients between TV Penetration and Agricultural
Protection Indicators by Percentile of per Capita GDP
Percentiles of gdppc
TV vs. Agricultural protection
RRA NRA
,5% 0.228 0.245
,10% 0.292 0.249
,25% 0.290 0.205
,50% 0.406 0.360
.50% 0.102 0.044
.75% 20.352 20.391
.90% 20.624 20.612
.95% 20.656 20.629
Note: The percentiles of gdppc refer to two different samples due to data availability for RRA
and NRA. The samples have the following median values of gdppc: USD 5,949.5 for the RRA
sample and USD 5,356.6 for the NRA sample.
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
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are consistent with the suggestions from figures 1 and 2. The correlation coeffi-
cient is approximately þ0.30 for percentiles below the median (,50 percent).
For per capita GDP values above the 75th percentile, the correlation becomes
negative, and increasingly so, reaching a value below 20.60 at the 95th percen-
tile. These correlations are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2: there is a differ-
ent relationship between agricultural policies and the spread of mass media in
rich and poor countries. For poor countries, the spread of mass media is associ-
ated with an increase in RRA (NRA), whereas in rich countries, the growth of
mass media is associated with a decline in RRA (NRA).
Of course, these are merely descriptive statistics. For a more formal analysis,
we now turn to an econometric analysis.
IV. E CONOME T R I C S T R AT E GY AND ID EN T I F I C AT I ON I S S U E S
Our hypotheses suggest that in countries with low gdppc, the media variables,
and RRA should be positively related, and when gdppc is high, there should be
an inverse relationship between these variables. A priori, we do not know at
what level of gdppc the relationship changes sign. By using a general specifica-
tion, we can derive the gdppc value at the turning point, if any, from the esti-
mated coefficients:
RRAit ¼ a0 þ a1mit1 þ a2 mit1  gdppcit1ð Þ þ a3gdppcit1 þ bxit1 þ 1it ð1Þ
where RRAit measures the relative rate of assistance in country i and year t,
mit-1 refers to the one-year lagged media variable, and xit-1 is a vector of addi-
tional controls. Taking the partial derivative of RRA with respect to the media
variable, we obtain
@RRA
@m
¼ a1 þ a2gdppc:
Given our hypotheses, we expect that a1 . 0 and a2 , 0, such that a1 þ a2
gdppc is positive (negative) as gdppc is higher (lower) than gdppc*, with
gdppc* ¼ a1/–a2 the level of development at which our media-protection rela-
tionship changes sign. We refer to this as the “turning point.” Note that a key
requirement for the predictions to hold is that gdppc* should lie within the
range of gdppc values in the dataset.
Regarding identification, our main concern is omitted variable bias. If the
media variables are correlated with unobserved determinants of the protection
level, our estimates will be inconsistent. Note that, a priori, the direction of the
bias is not predictable. Therefore, our basic specification always includes a set
of country (hi) and year fixed effects (qt):
RRAit ¼ a1mit1 þ a2 mit1  gdppcit1ð Þ þ a3gdppcit1 þ bxit1 þ hi þ qt þ 1it: ð2Þ
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However, this approach does not allow us to properly isolate the causal effect
of increased mass media consumption for two main reasons. First, country
fixed effects do not control for unobservable, country-specific, time-varying
factors correlated with both the media and agricultural protection. Second, po-
tential measurement errors in the gdppc indicator may introduce further endo-
geneity problems (Deaton 2005). Indeed, the correlation between gdppc and
the media variables may bias the estimated media coefficients (and the interac-
tion term between the media and gdppc), a problem exacerbated by the fixed
effects transformation (Wooldridge 2002). Thus, to make our identification as-
sumption more credible, we adopt two additional strategies.
First, given our specific concern regarding (omitted) time-varying factors cor-
related with both media variables and protection, in addition to the time
dummies, we include continent-year interaction effects to control for changes
over time that affect countries within a region similarly.8 In addition, as discussed
in the data section, beyond the traditional determinants of agricultural protection
that have been found relevant in previous studies, we include several other covari-
ates, such as indicators of trade openness, trade policy reforms, government con-
sumption, and economic crises, to increase the similarity between the countries.
Second, to directly address measurement error problems and other forms of
endogeneity, we also employ dynamic panel methods. Specifically, we use the
system generalized methods of moment (SYS-GMM), developed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). By estimating a system of
equations in first differences and levels and employing instruments, this ap-
proach should allow for consistent estimations even in the presence of measure-
ment errors and other forms of endogeneity (see Bond et al. 2001). Our
SYS-GMM dynamic panel model has the following specification:
DRRAit ¼ a1DRRAit1 þ a2Dmit1 þ a3Dðmit1  gdppcit1Þ þ a4Dgdppcit1þ
þ b0Dxit1 þ qt þ yit
ð3aÞ
RRAit ¼ a0 þ a1RRAit1 þ a2mit1 þ a3ðmit1  gdppcit1Þ þ a4gdppcit1þ
þ b0xit1 þ qt þ yit
ð3bÞ
where D denotes first differences, that is, Dyit ¼ yit – yit-1, RRAit-1 is the lagged
dependent variable and y it is a disturbance term. In estimating the system of
equations (3a)–(3b), the (endogenous) lagged dependent variable is instrument-
ed by its t – 2, t – 3, and longer lags, using the lagged levels for the first-
8. These interaction effects capture any regional differences in the agricultural protection dynamic.
We also tested a second specification in which we included continent-specific polynomial terms over
time, and the results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
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differences equation (3a) and the lagged differences for the level equation (3b).
Similarly, to address endogeneity in other explanatory variables (such as the
media variable and its interaction with gdppc), they can be instrumented by
their respective t – 2, t – 3, and longer lags. The validity of a particular assump-
tion can then be tested using standard generalized methods of moment tests of
overidentifying restrictions. In summary, the SYS-GMM specification should
allow for greater flexibility, improved control for omitted time-varying factors
through the lagged dependent variable and, finally, greater consistency even in
the presence of endogenous regressors. However, it is important to stress that
this estimator does not resolve endogeneity problems due to omitted variables
with persistent effects, such as when the TV trend is correlated with the RRA
(NRA) trend, as a result of an omitted (possibly time-invariant) variable.
V. REGR E S S I ON R E S U LT S
This section presents the results of our econometric analyses. We present first
the results of the static model and afterward the dynamic panel results. We
evaluate the robustness of the results by testing whether the results are sensitive
to country and time coverage and to the use of different indicators for key
variables.
Static Model
Table 3 reports the static fixed effects results of different specifications based
on equation (2), with columns (1)–(4) using RRA and (5)–(6) using NRA as
the dependent variable. In every regression, the standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered
within countries.
The results in column 1 show that the simple fixed effects specification,
without controls apart from gdppc, yields statistically significant coefficients
(p-value, 0.01) for both the linear effect and the interaction effect of TV pen-
etration with gdppc. The positive sign for the linear term and the negative sign
for the interaction effect are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. The penetra-
tion of TV is associated with a higher RRA at low levels of development but
with a lower RRA at higher levels. In regression (1), the turning point for the
relationship is a per capita GDP level of USD 6,013. This number is virtually
identical to the sample median value, which is equal to USD 5,949.
Columns (2) and (3) report regressions that control for the standard agricul-
tural protection covariates (agricultural employment share, comparative advan-
tage, country size, and the quality of democracy) and additional variables, such
as trade openness, government consumption to GDP, and crises indicators.
In column (4), we add a set of continent-year interaction effects to control
for differences in regional protection dynamics. The different specifications
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yield consistent results both in terms of coefficients and the significance of the
media variables.
Columns (5) and (6) report the results of regressions analogous to columns
(3) and (4) but using the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) as the dependent
variable instead of RRA. The estimated media coefficients are very similar, and
the results are thus robust to using different indicators of agricultural support.
TABLE 3. Effect of TV Penetration on Agricultural Protection
Dependent variable RRA RRA RRA RRA NRA NRA
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log TV 8.839 6.912 8.358 8.131 9.433 8.025
(0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
Log TV * GDP per capita
( 100)
20.147 20.122 20.138 20.125 20.177 20.148
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.009
(0.018) (0.024) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Employment share 21.200 21.054 20.909 21.426 21.247
(0.050) (0.081) (0.163) (0.015) (0.037)
Land per capita 21.622 22.033 21.712 23.076 22.905
(0.137) (0.069) (0.223) (0.047) (0.085)
Export share 210.885 29.133 28.974 215.993 212.964
(0.264) (0.354) (0.476) (0.134) (0.335)
Log population 20.071 20.132 0.159 20.096 20.059
(0.765) (0.574) (0.629) (0.733) (0.848)
Polity2 (democracy index) 0.951 0.926 0.831 1.314 1.224
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Government consumption 0.537 0.630 0.176 0.320
(0.217) (0.137) (0.726) (0.544)
Trade to GDP 0.014 20.038 20.007 20.029
(0.772) (0.510) (0.884) (0.607)
Sachs-Warner trade policy index 20.975 17.553 18.127 16.444
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Lagged_1 crisis 20.090 0.847 0.382 1.185
(0.956) (0.601) (0.815) (0.463)
Lagged_2 crisis 1.007 2.072 0.780 1.871
(0.427) (0.121) (0.536) (0.166)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental-years interaction effects No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,025 1,996 1,935 1,935 2,001 2,001
Countries 69 69 67 67 69 69
Adj. R2 0.857 0.865 0.871 0.880 0.858 0.866
Critical GDP per capita 6,013 5,666 6,057 6,504 5,330 5,422
Note: OLS regressions; p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by countries in pa-
rentheses; all controls entered with one year lagged; continental (Asia, Africa, Latin America) and
year interaction effects included as indicated (see text).
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
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To put the estimates into perspective, we illustrate the size of the media
effects using the Philippines and Taiwan as examples. These two countries
have average per capita GDP values in the period covered by the analysis of
USD 1,854 and USD 9,987, respectively, which are significantly lower and
higher than the critical turning point of the estimated relationship. Using the
estimated coefficients of the full model (column (4)), a 10 percent increase in
the share of households with TVs would be associated with a 4.8 percent in-
crease in agricultural protection in the Philippines, but the same increase would
reduce the Taiwan’ agricultural protection by 6.4 percent.9 This finding sug-
gests that if there is a causal affect, its magnitude could be substantial.
In a working paper version of this article (Olper and Swinnen 2012), we pre-
sented similar regressions using radio penetration as media variable. When
using radio penetration as an indicator, the patterns of the results are similar to
those obtained using TV, but the significance levels of the media variables are
lower and less robust. More specifically, including additional controls, the
radio penetration linear term is positively and significantly correlated with pro-
tection, but the interaction term with per capita GDP, while still negative, is no
longer statistically significant. A possible interpretation of these results is that
radio is a more important news source in poor countries, whereas TV matters
most in emerging and rich countries.
Dynamic Panel Model
As discussed in section IV, the results obtained from the (static) fixed effects
model may still suffer from endogeneity bias, particularly as a result of mea-
surement errors. To account for this problem, table 4 reports the results of
dynamic panel estimates that control for persistency in agricultural protection.
To avoid problems resulting from the use of an excessive number of instru-
ments in the SYS-GMM estimator, the specification only controls for the stan-
dard covariates (as in column (2) of table 3).10
Columns (1) and (2) report the results using ordinary least squares (OLS)
and least squares with dummy variables. The OLS and least squares with
dummy variables results serve as benchmarks for the evaluation of the
SYS-GMM specification and should be upward and downward biased com-
pared to the SYS-GMM, respectively. In the SYS-GMM estimates, the media
variables and per-capita GDP are treated as endogenous variables and instru-
mented with their t 2 2 and higher lagged values. The SYS-GMM results for
RRA and NRA are presented in columns (3) and (4). As expected, the magni-
tude of the coefficient on lagged RRA is above the estimated least squares with
dummy variables value and below the estimated OLS value (and similar for
9. Both elasticities are evaluated at the mean value of the RRA distribution, equal to 12.7 percent.
10. Note that this does not substantially affect our results because the autoregressive term largely
absorbs these omitted terms (see Roodman, 2009).
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NRA). Moreover, neither the basic Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
nor the Difference-in-Hansen test, related to the additional instruments used by
the level equation, detects any problem with instrumental validity. These obser-
vations all suggest that our instruments are valid and informative and the
SYS-GMM estimator is consistent.
The estimated coefficients of TV penetration presented in columns (3) and
(4) are significant and consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2 in the SYS-GMM re-
gressions. These estimated coefficients measure short-term correlations. To
compare them with the static results, one should use the long-run correlations,
TABLE 4. TV Penetration and Agricultural Protection: Dynamic Panel Model
Dependent variable RRA RRA RRA NRA
Estimation method OLS LSDV SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged RRA (NRA) 0.9104 0.7407 0.8309 0.8183
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log TV 0.838 2.058 2.956 3.218
(0.006) (0.020) (0.010) (0.017)
Log TV * GDP per capita ( 100) 20.028 20.037 20.078 20.092
(0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita 0.0014 0.0018 0.0037 0.0043
(0.002) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment share 0.024 20.195 0.145 0.181
(0.396) (0.230) (0.090) (0.066)
Land per capita 20.248 20.481 20.459 20.518
(0.001) (0.133) (0.000) (0.002)
Export share 23.124 21.153 25.394 27.618
(0.001) (0.799) (0.001) (0.000)
Log population 20.022 0.261 20.040 20.049
(0.411) (0.715) (0.476) (0.456)
Polity2 (democracy index) 0.123 0.337 0.190 0.236
(0.023) (0.001) (0.023) (0.008)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR2 test (p-value) 0.03 0.08
AR3 test (p-value) 0.25 0.34
Hansen (p-value) 0.39 0.65
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.65 0.43
Instruments 82 82
Observations 1,984 1,984 1,984 2,058
Countries 69 69 69 69
R2 0.94 0.94
Critical GDP per capita 2,992 5,563 3,790 3,498
Note: p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses;
SYS-GMM based on xtabond2 in Stata, with instruments structured with lag (3) for RRA
(NRA), and lag (2) for the media variables and gdppc; Additional instruments used for the level
equation are the t – 3 first difference of the RRA (NRA) and the t – 2 first difference for media
variables and gdppc; the collapse option is also used to control for instrument proliferation.
LSDV represents least squares with dummy variables.
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
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which can be obtained by dividing the estimated coefficients by one minus the
autoregressive coefficient. We obtain values equal to 17.46 for the linear term
and 20.0046 for the interaction with income level and similar values for the
NRA specification. Thus, the magnitudes of the estimated (long-run) media
correlations in the dynamic SYS-GMM model are (in absolute value) approxi-
mately two times higher than those of the static model (see columns (3) and (5)
of table 3). This result is consistent with the presence of attenuation bias due
to measurement errors in the variables. This problem is exacerbated in the
fixed effect specification but is efficiently accounted for in the generalized
methods of moment approach (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 313).11
Further Robustness Tests
We performed a series of additional robustness tests to further check our
results, testing whether the results are sensitive to country and time coverage
and to the use of different indicators for the group size effect and development.
Columns (1)–(4) of table 5 report sensitivity analyses for the media-
protection relationship with different ranges of countries and periods. One
problem with our results may be that both the structural adjustment programs
of the 1980s and the beginning of the GATT Uruguay Round in the mid-1980s
caused an effect that interfered with our media-protection relationship: a re-
duction in agricultural taxation in developing countries and a reduction in agri-
cultural protection in developed countries. Columns (1) and (2) examine this
possibility by running the model using only observations before and after
1985, respectively. Although the magnitude of the estimated relationship is dif-
ferent in both periods (approximately three times larger in magnitude after
1985),12 the relationship is also estimated with high precision for years before
1985, suggesting that the abovementioned confounding effects do not drive the
results.
Another possibility is that our nonlinear media-protection relationship is
driven by some group of sensitive observations related to a particular group of
poor or rich countries. To check this possibility, in columns (3) and (4), we ex-
cluded from the regressions observations for countries with a gdppc lower than
USD 1,000 and higher than USD 25,000, respectively.13 The results remain
consistent and significant, although the sizes of the coefficients change some-
what. Dropping observations for the poorest countries increases the magnitude
11. Note that when comparing the SYS-GMM and the static fixed effects results, at least in terms of
the magnitude of the media effect, these may also differ because the two models differ not only in terms
of the estimator used but also in terms of the covariates included.
12. One likely reason for this difference is that the expansion of TVs in developing and emerging
countries did not begin before the early 1980s.
13. Note that the results are fairly robust to the use of other gdppc thresholds. For example, by
excluding observations with gdppc values below USD 5,000 or higher than USD 20,000 and thus
working with approximately half of the sample, the media-protection relationship is still statistically
significant.
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TABLE 5. Robustness Checks: SYS-GMM Regressions over Different Samples
Dependent variable RRA RRA RRA RRA RRA RRA NRA
Interaction with gdppc gdppc gdppc gdppc gdppc emp emp
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lagged RRA (NRA) 0.893 0.796 0.838 0.877 0.799 0.909 0.895
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log TV 1.478 6.313 3.604 1.966 2.073 22.306 2 3.094
(0.025) (0.011) (0.050) (0.004) (0.016) (0.104) (0.028)
Log TV * GDP per capita (or emps) 0.029 0.093 0.088 0.038 0.084 3.996 5.277
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001)
GDP per capita 0.0014 0.0044 0.0041 0.0018 0.0039 0.0022 0.0032
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.027) (0.002)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR2 test (p-value) 0.35 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.08
AR3 test (p-value) 0.10 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.61 0.37 0.52
Hansen (p-value) 0.96 0.22 0.92 0.30 0.91 0.10 0.02
Instruments 69 70 76 79 84 69 69
Observations 834 1,206 1,720 1,698 1,785 1,984 2,058
Countries 55 68 63 69 63 69 69
Sample ,1985 .1985 gdppc . USD 1,000 gdppc , USD 25,000 Richer/poorest excluded All All
Critical GDP per capita (emps) 5,097 6,788 4,096 5,173 2,468 (0.58) (0.59)
Notes: Each column reports a regression for a specific countries/years sample with characteristics indicated at the bottom of the table: , (.) 1985
means that the regression is run for data before or after 1985; gdppc. 1,000 (, 25,000) means that the regression considered only countries/years data
with gdppc higher (lower) than 1,000 (25,000) international U.S. dollars; richer/poorest excluded are excluding the three richest and poorest countries
from the regression (namely, the United States, Norway, and Switzerland and Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe). The p-values in parentheses are
based on robust standard errors clustered by countries; SYS-GMM is based on xtabond2 in Stata, with instruments structured with lag (3) for RRA and
lag (2) for media variables and gdppc (emps); additional instruments used for the level equation are the t – 3 first difference of the RRA and the t – 2
first difference for media variables and gdppc; the collapse option is used to control for instrument proliferation. Additional controls included in every re-
gression are emps, landpc, exps, log(pop), and Polity2, all lagged one year, and year fixed effects.
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
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of the estimated relationship; dropping observations for the richest countries
reduces the estimated effects compared to the benchmark SYS-GMM regression
in Column (3) of table 4. These results are consistent with hypothesis 2 (adver-
tiser value effect), suggesting that farmers in the poorest developing countries
may be too poor to attract advertisers and media coverage. The findings may
also be consistent with an unbalanced increase in media diffusion between
rural and urban areas. If rural areas have some lag in media penetration com-
pared to urban areas, the media protection relationship will be weaker in the
poorest countries.
In column (5), we simultaneously exclude observations for the three richest
(the United States, Norway, and Switzerland) and the three poorest countries
(Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe) from the regression. Once again, the
results are very robust.
Columns (6) and (7) of table 5 present an additional robustness check using
the agricultural employment share (emps) to interact with the media effect. For
both RRA and NRA, all key variables have signs consistent with our hypothe-
ses. Although the regression results with emps are less stable than those with
gdppc (likely as a result of severe measurement errors in the emps variable), the
key conclusions are robust to a change in the structural variable.14
Finally, as discussed in the conceptual framework section, there may be ad-
ditional nonlinearity in the relationship between media coverage and policies
resulting from a nonlinear relationship between economic growth and the
rural-urban income gap and the relative urban-rural gap in TV distribution,
which would affect the value of both groups to advertisers and thus the
channel through which the mass media affect agricultural protection. To test
for this, we added an additional interaction effect between TV and the square
of gdppc to the model specifications. In some specifications, this additional
media interaction term is significant and negative, consistent with the hypothe-
sis. However, the results are less robust than those without the additional non-
linear term. These results are presented in Olper and Swinnen (2012).
V I . CONC L U S I ON S
This paper provides evidence of the relationship between mass media competi-
tion and agricultural protection for a large group of countries. Stro¨mberg’s
(2004a) theory predicts that information provided by the mass media, reflecting
14. There are well-known problems with the agricultural employment data, which are generally
linear interpolations between a few observations (often one per decade) and suffer from serious
measurement errors (see Timmer and de Vries, 2007). The model specification tests reported at the
bottom of the table indicate a well-specified SYS-GMM model for the RRA regression but not for the
NRA regression, where the Hansen test rejects the null of the validity of the additional overidentifying
restrictions. However, the autocorrelation tests indicate that the model is well specified. Considering the
strong measurement errors in the employment data and that Hansen tests have weak power, such results
are unsurprising.
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the media’s incentives to provide news to different groups in society, affects
government policy making and who benefits from government policies. The
theory predicts that mass media competition will induce a policy bias toward
large groups and groups that are more valuable to advertisers; these groups are
more informed because the mass media target them.
We apply this theory to agricultural policy. This results in the hypotheses
that (a) given the changing role of the agricultural sector due to economic de-
velopment, the impact of mass media competition on agricultural policy will
differ between poor and rich countries, ceteris paribus, and (b) this effect is
contrary to the so-called development paradox of agricultural policies. Thus,
the traditional change in agricultural policy from taxation to subsidization that
is associated with economic development will be smoothed in the presence of
mass media competition. We hypothesize that this is due to a combination of
the group size effect, with larger groups being more attractive to the media,
and the advertiser value effect, with richer groups being more attractive audi-
ences for the media.
We use data on agricultural policy from 69 countries spanning a wide range
of development stages and media markets to test these predictions. Our empiri-
cal results are consistent with the theoretical hypotheses. We find a significant and
robust correlation between public support for agriculture and TV penetration,
which is conditional on the structure of the economy. In particular, an increase in
media penetration is correlated with policies that benefit the majority to a greater
extent; it is correlated with a reduction in agricultural taxation in poor countries
and a reduction in agricultural subsidies in rich countries, ceteris paribus.
These results are robust to the use of different indicators of agricultural poli-
cies, different media variables and different control variables and estimation
techniques.
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